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LOOKING AT GIFT HORSES:
TRANSFEREE LIABILITY AND THE
BAPTISTE CASES
Imagine that you have two clients sitting in your office. The clients
are brothers. One lives locally and the other lives in a different state
some 1500 miles away. The brothers are having difficulties with a tax
issue concerning a transaction in which they are involved together.
They have each received a deficiency notice from the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") and they have lost an initial set of proceedings before
the U.S. Tax Court. The brothers had been acting pro se, but have now
come to you for advice. You have found no case law directly on point.
You have found, however, one potentially helpful federal circuit case.
The case is not from a circuit in which either brother lives, but the
issue is closely related to the one facing the brothers and the holding
supports their position. While less than certain of the final result, you
at least expect that the outcome at the respective circuit court level
(should the issue progress that far) would be the same for each of the
brothers.
If the issue in question was the extent of transferee liability for
federal estate taxes, your expectation might be incorrect. In 1994, the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the Elev-
enth Circuit addressed this issue in two separate cases, each named
Baptiste v. Commissioner.' The cases arose out of the same transaction
and involved two brothers, one a resident of Nebraska and one a
resident of Florida. 2
 The courts reached directly opposite conclusions
on the extent of the transferee liability of each brother. 3
Each circuit court held that the respective brother was liable for
unpaid federal estate taxes from his father's estate because the brother
had received assets that had been included in the father's taxable
estate.' The Eighth Circuit also held that the extent of the liability of
Gabriel Baptiste, Jr. was limited to the value of the assets he had actually
received, even though the unpaid estate tax liability then exceeded that
I See generally Baptiste v. Commissioner, 29 F.3d 1533 (11th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Baptiste
Ill]; Baptiste v. Commissioner, 29 F.3d 433 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1251 (1995)
[hereinafter Baptiste II].
2 See Baptiste v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 252, 253 n.3 (1993) [hereinafter Baptiste I].
3
 Compare. Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1535, with Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 438.
4 Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1538; Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 437.
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amount because of accrued interest. 5 The Eighth Circuit based this
holding on what it referred to as a plain language interpretation of
statutory provisions in the Internal Revenue Codes
The Eleventh Circuit concluded, however, that Richard Baptiste
was liable for the full amount of the unpaid estate tax liability, even
though that amount exceeded the value of the assets he had received.'
The court reasoned that the interest that had accrued on the unpaid
estate taxes was an independent liability and was not subject to the
statutory language which might otherwise have limited the extent of
Richard's liability. 8 In summary, the two circuits came to directly oppo-
site conclusions on cases involving an identical fact patterns
This Note examines the cases involving the Baptiste brothers and
concludes that the logic of both circuit courts was flawed because the
courts failed to consider an alternative approach which is both consis-
tent with the law as already applied in a related area and more accu-
rately reflects the equities of the situation.w Section I examines the
statutory framework surrounding the issue of transferee liability." Sec-
tion II examines the relevant case law and presents a detailed history
of the various cases involving the Baptistes.' 2 Section III addresses some
of the planning implications that arise for the practicing attorney
concerning transferee liability as a result of the split in the circuits.''
Section III also analyzes the principal arguments of the respective
circuit courts and presents an initial conclusion that the logic of the
Eleventh Circuit more accurately reflects the apparent intent of Con-
gress than the logic of the Eighth Circuit." Finally, Section IV considers
an alternative approach to the issue of transferee liability and con-
cludes that this alternative approach is consistent with the application
of the law in at least one related area and more accurately reflects the
equities of the situation. 15
5 Baptiste 11,29 F.3d at 437-38.
"ht.
7 Baptiste 111,29 F.3d at 1541.
8 Id at 1541-42.
9 Compare Baptiste 111,29 F.3d at 1535, with Baptiste 11,29 F.3d at 438.
"See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 16-48 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 49-170 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 174-87 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
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I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Subtitle B of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") generally gov-
erns federal estate taxes."' In particular, section 2001 of the Code
imposes a tax ("estate tax") on the transfer of the taxable estate of
every decedent who was a citizen or resident of the United States at
the time of death.'? Section 2001 also requires the executor or admin-
istrator of the decedent's estate to file an estate tax return.' 8 Section
2001 further establishes that the payment of an estate tax is due at the
time fixed for the filing of the estate tax return.'" Section 2002 of the
Code provides that the executor or administrator of the estate shall
pay the estate tax. 20
A. Existence of Transferee Liability
Subtitle F of the Code generally governs procedural and adminis-
trative matters relating to federal income, estate and gift taxes. 2 ' Chap-
ter 64 of Subtitle F addresses the collection of these tax liabilities. 22 In
particular, section 6324(a) (2) provides that if the executor or admin-
istrator of an estate does not pay the estate tax when due, the transferee
of any property that was included in the decedent's gross estate at the
time of the decedent's death will be personally liable for the un-
paid tax."
Section 6901(a) of the Code prescribes the assessment and collec-
tion of this transferee liability if the executor or administrator does not
properly pay the estate tax. 24
 Section 6901(a) (I) (A) (ii) provides that
the assessment, collection and payment of a transferee's liability for
estate taxes are subject to the same provisions and limitations as the
original, underlying estate tax liability. 25 Under section 6902(a) of the
See generally I.R.C. §§ 2001 -201 (1988).
17 1d. § 2001.
18 Id. Section 6018(1) limits this requirement for filing a return to estates in which the value
of the gross estate of a citizen or resident at the time of death was in excess of $600,000. Id.
§ 6018(1).
19 1d. § 2001. Section 6075(a) further establishes that the due date for the estate tax return
is generally no later than nine months after the date of the decedent's death. Id. § 6075(a).
20 Id. § 2002.
21 See generally I.R.C. §§ 6001-7873.
See generally id. §§ 6300-44.
25 1d. § 63240)(2).
24
 Id. § 6901 (a).
25
 Id. § 6901(a) (1) (A)(ii).
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Code, the IRS has the burden of proving that an individual is liable as
a transferee of the property of the decedent. 26
The purpose of imposing transferee liability is to prevent transfer-
ors from escaping estate tax liability by transferring property to an-
other entity.21 Transferee liability applies not only to the initial trans-
feree, but also to any subsequent transferee of the initial transferee:28
The combination of these various Code sections ensures that the IRS
can collect the full amount of estate tax due on the estate of any
decedent regardless of whether the executor or administrator makes
the tax payment. 29
B. Extent of Transferee Liability
Although section 6324(a) (2) creates transferee liability, it also
imposes limits on the extent of that liability." Under section 6324(a) (2),
a transferee's personal liability is limited to the value of the property
that the transferee actually receives. 3 ' The value of the property for this
purpose is determined as of the date of the decedent's death. 32
Chapter 67 of the Code generally addresses the subject of inter-
est." Section 6601(a) provides that the party responsible for paying the
original, underlying tax liability shall also pay interest on any amount
of that liability that the party does not pay before the last date that the
Code prescribes for payment. 34 Section 6601(e) (1) of the Code states
that the term "tax" includes any interest that the Code imposes on any
unpaid tax liabilities."
C. Statutory Interpretation
The inquiry concerning the interpretation of a statute begins with
the language of the statute itself. 38 When the meaning of the language
is unambiguous, that meaning is generally conclusive in the interpre-
tation of the statute unless the literal application of the statute is
26 1.R.C. § 6902(a).
21 See Brief for Appellee at 21, Baptiste 11 (No. 93-2960).
28 See id.
29
 I.R.C. § 6901(c) (2).
30 /d. § 6342(a) (2).
" Id.
"See id.
33 See generally id. §§ 6601-22.
34 1.R.C. § 6601(a).
33 Id. § 6601(e) (I).
36 See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681,685 (1985).
May 19971	 'TRANSFEREE LIABILITY	 481
demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters." In such cases,
the intention of the drafters controls, rather than the strict language."
The interpretation of the statutes concerning the determination
of the extent of transferee liability for estate taxes depends upon
determining the nature of the additional liability for interest that
section 6601(a) imposes." One possible interpretation is that section
6324(a) (2), taken together with section 6601(e), places a cap on the
extent of transferee liability.40 Under this interpretation, the original
tax liability plus any accumulated interest cannot exceed the value of
the property that the transferee actually receives.'"
A second possible interpretation is that the language of section
6324(a) (2) does not explicitly state that the liability of the transferee
is a tax liability. 42 Rather, section 6324(a) (2) imposes an obligation on
the transferee simply to satisfy the original tax liability of the estate."
Under this interpretation, the fact that the obligation of the estate is a
tax liability does not necessarily mean that the obligation of the trans-
feree is also a tax liability." If the transferee's liability is not a tax liability,
but a general personal liability, then the accumulated interest on the
original liability is not a tax liability either." Instead, the interest rep-
resents a separate, independent liability.° As an independent liability,
the interest would not be subject to the limitations on transferee
liability that section 6324(a) (2) imposes. 47 As a result, the total trans-
feree liability including interest could exceed the value of the property
that the transferee actually receives."
II. CASE LAW
In 1988, in Poinier v. Commissioner ("Poinier If), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the total amount of a
donee's transferee liability in the context of federal gift taxes cannot
exceed the total amount of the gift itself." The Third Circuit based its
37 See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982),
38 See id.
39 See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1541.
40 See Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 437.
41 See id.
42 See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1541.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See id. at 1541-42.
46 See id. at 1542.
47 See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1542.
48 See id. at 1542-43.
"858 F.2d 917, 923 (3d Or. 1988) [hereinafter Poinier
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holding on a plain language reading of section 6324(b) of the Code,
which is the gift tax counterpart to the estate tax provisions of section
6324(a) (2)." Section 6324(b) provides that if the donor does not pay
the gift tax when it is due, the donee transferee of the gift shall be
personally liable for the gift tax to the extent of the value of the gift."
Lois Poinier ("Poinier") and W. Page Wodell ("Wodell") were the
children of Helen W. Halbach ("Helen") and the grandchildren of
Parker Webster Page ("Parker")." Parker died in January of 1937."
Under the provisions of a trust created in Parker's will, his wife Nellie
("Nellie") received the income from the trust for her lifetime. 54 Upon
Nellie's death, the remainder interest of the trust passed in equal
shares to Helen and to Parker's other daughter, Lois Page Cottrell
("Lois")." Nellie died at age one hundred on April 14, 1970." Later
that month, both Helen and Lois renounced their shares in the re-
mainder interest of the trust in favor of their respective children.'' At
that time, the value of Helen's remainder interest was in excess of ten
million dollars." Neither Helen nor Lois filed a gift tax return covering
the value of their disclaimed remainder interest."
On June 25, 1981, more than eleven years after Helen's renuncia-
tion, the IRS sent a notice of gift tax liability to Helen's estate." The
6° Id. at 920.
51
 I.R.C. § 6324(b) (1988).
52 See Poinier II, 858 F.2d at 917-18.
53 See id. at 917.
54 See id. at 917-18.
55 See id. at 918.
56 See id.
57 See Poinier A 858 F.2d at 918. Helen made her renunciation on April 19, 1970, and Lois
made her renunciation on April 30, 1970. See id.
511 See Id,
55 See Id.
6° See id. at 918-19. The IRS had previously sent a notice of deficiency to Lois in the amount
of over $4.6 million in the early 1970s, again on the basis of Lois' renunciation not being made
on a timely basis. See id. at 918. The Tax Court held that because the renunciation was not made
within a reasonable time after knowledge of the existence of the transfer, a taxable gift was made.
See id. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the time to renounce
does not begin until the remainder interest is indefeasibly fixed in both quality and quantity.
Cottrell v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1980). The IRS did not petition for
certiorari. See Poinier II, 858 F.2d at 918. Thus, neither Lois as donor nor her children as
transferees ever paid a gift tax on their portion of the transfer. See id.
Shortly after the Cottrell decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit came to the
opposite conclusion in Jewett v. Commissioner, effectively agreeing with the Tax Court position in
Cottrell See 638 F.2d 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict and affirmed Jewett. Jewett v. Commissioner, 455 U.S. 305, 319 (1982). About three weeks
after the Supreme Court granted certiorari for Jewett, the IRS sent the deficiency notice to Helen's
estate. See Poinier II, 858 F.2d at 918-19. Helen had died on August 5, 1972. See id. at 918.
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IRS contended that Helen had not renounced her remainder interest
in her father's estate within a "reasonable" time period, thus making
the renunciation ineffective. 61 The IRS argued that Helen should have
made the renunciation within a reasonable time after she knew of the
transfer of the remainder interest to her, rather than within a reason-
able time from the actual vesting of the interest. 62 The IRS also sent
notices of transferee liability to Helen's children, Poinier and Wodell,
who were the ultimate beneficiaries of Helen's interest in Parker's
trust.°
Poinier, Wodell and the executor of Helen's estate all filed peti-
tions in the Tax Court seeking a redetermination of the deficiency
and the extent of the transferee liabilities. 64 In Commissioner v. Poinier
("Poinier .I"), the Tax Court determined that Helen's renunciation was
ineffective because she had not made it on a timely basis.° The Tax
Court found that Helen's estate owed a gift tax of over $4.9 million
plus interest from April 15, 1971. 66
 The Tax Court also held that
because Poinier and Wodell had each received over $5.2 million from
their grandfather's trust as a result of the renunciation, they were liable
as transferees to the extent of the deficiency plus interest without
limit. 67 The Tax Court held, however, that Poinier and Wodell were
only liable for the interest that had accrued from June 25, 1981, the
date that the IRS notified them of their transferee liability. 68
In Poinier II, the Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's finding
that Helen had made a taxable transfer to Poinier and Wode11. 6° The
Third Circuit reversed, however, the Tax Court's determination that
the transferees were liable for interest to the extent that the interest
plus the original liability exceeded the value of the gift. 7° The Third
Circuit rejected the IRS's argument that two separate liabilities existed
under section 6324(b), one for the unpaid gift tax liability and another
for the independent interest liability. 71 The IRS contended that the
61 See Poinier II, 858 F.2d at 918. The current factors that the IRS consider in the determina-
tion of a reasonable time for making an effective renunciation are contained in 26 C.F.R.
§ 25.2511-1(c) (1988).
62 See Poinier II, 858 F.2d at 918.
61 See id. at 918-19.
64 See id. at 919.
65 90 T.C. 63, 67 (1987) [hereinafter Poinier I].
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 858 F.2d at 923.
70
 Id. at 922-23.
71
 Id. at 920.
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limitation on the extent of a donee's gift tax liability to the value of
the gift actually received did not apply to the independent liability for
interest." The Third Circuit stated, however, that this was "not an easy
argument to articulate."" The court noted that unlike the donee liabil-
ity provision in section 6324(b), the IRS could not point to any specific
Code provision establishing an independent liability for the interest. 74
The Third Circuit emphasized that its rejection of the IRS's position
advocating an independent liability was both consistent with the plain
language of the Code and was "sensible." 75
Judge Seitz dissented in part from the court's opinion." His dis-
sent questioned, however, only the court's determination of the date
from which the interest attributable to the donee transferees began to
accrue. 77
 judge Seitz stated that section 6601 mandated the accrual of
interest from the date that the Tax Court determines the existence of
a tax deficiency." As such, Judge Seitz concurred with the court's
overall finding that section 6324(b) of the Code requires that the
extent of the total transferee liability for gift taxes plus interest cannot
exceed the value of the gift itself."
On July 12, 1994, in Baptiste v. Commissioner ("Baptiste IF), the
Eighth Circuit similarly held that section 6324(a) (2) of the Code limits
the extent of total transferee liability for estate taxes plus interest to
the value of the property received." The Eighth Circuit followed the
Third Circuit's reasoning in Poinier II with respect to gift taxes to
conclude that a plain language reading of section 6324(a) (2) dictated
that the extent of the transferee's liability should be capped at the
value of the property received for estate taxes, as wel1. 8 ' On August 29,
1994, however, in Baptiste v. Commissioner ("Baptiste III'), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the liabil-
ity for interest is independent from the transferee liability for estate
taxes.82
 As such, the court concluded that only the transferee's liability
for the original underlying estate tax is subject to the cap in section
71 See id.
73 Id.
74
 Poinier II, 858 F.2d at 920.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 923 (Seitz, J., dissenting).
77 Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting).
78 Id. (Seitz, J., dissenting).
79
 Poinier II, 858 F.2d at 923 (Seitz, J., dissenting).
80 29 F.3d 433, 437 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.. 1251 (1995).
81
 Id. at 437-38.
82 Baptiste III, 29 F.3d 1533, 1542-43 (11th Cir. 1994).
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6324(a) (2)." Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that a transferee's total
liability including interest can exceed the value of the property re-
ceived."
Gabriel Baptiste, Sr. ("Baptiste") died on September 26, 1981. 85 At
the time, Baptiste was a United States citizen but was living in Vene-
zuela." Baptiste was survived by his second wife, who was a Venezuelan
national.87
 At the time of Baptiste's death, he owned an insurance
policy on his life in the amount of $150,000. 88
 The beneficiaries of the
life insurance policy were Baptiste's three children, Richard Baptiste
("Richard"), Gabriel Baptiste, Jr. ("Gabriel") and Barbara Baptiste ("Bar-
bara"). 89
 Each of the beneficiaries received $50,000 from the life insur-
ance policy shortly after Baptiste's death."
Barbara was the executor for Baptiste's estate."' Barbara properly
included the value of the life insurance policy in the calculation of her
father's taxable estate. 92 Baptiste's second wife, however, held the re-
maining assets of his estate in Venezuela." The second wife refused to
release any assets for the payment of the estate tax liability." As such,
when Barbara filed a federal estate tax return for Baptiste's estate on
December 29, 1982, she did not make any estate tax payments."
After examining the return, the IRS determined that there was a
deficiency in the estate tax. 96
 On September 18, 1985, the IRS mailed
a notice of deficiency to Barbara, as executor. 97
 Barbara then filed a
timely petition in the Tax Court contesting the deficiency." Subsequently,
the IRS and Barbara reached an agreement that the estate owed estate
taxes of $62,378.48 to the IRS.'" Pursuant to that agreement, the Tax
Court entered a stipulated decision on May 13, 1988, that the estate
83
 /d. at 1542.
84 Id. at 1542-43.
85 See id. at 1535.
86 See Brief for Appellant at 3, Baptiste II (No. 93-2960).
87 See id.
88 See Baptiste 111, 29 F.3d at 15 35.
89 See Brief for Appellee at 1 n .3, Baptiste 11 (No. 93-2960).
9D See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 15 35.
91 See id.
92
 See id.
93 See id.
94
 See id.
95 See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 15 35.
96 See id.
97 See Baptiste. II, 29 F.3d at 433
98 See id.
99 See id. at 434.
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owed an estate tax in the amount of $62,378.48. 100 The estate, however,
again failed to pay the estate tax because Baptiste's second wife con-
tinued to refuse to release any of the estate's assets. 101
On October 6, 1989, the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency
to Richard and to Gabriel on the basis of their status as transferees.' 12
The notice asserted an assessment for unpaid estate taxes in the amount
of $50,000 plus interest as provided by law. 1 °3
 On January 2, 1990,
Richard and Gabriel each filed a timely petition in the Tax Court to
contest the amount of their respective liabilities. 104 In their petitions,
neither Richard nor Gabriel challenged his personal liability as a trans-
feree. 1 °5
At this point, both Richard and Gabriel were acting pro se. 1 °6 The
IRS filed an answer to Richard's and Gabriel's petitions which set forth
an affirmative allegation that Richard and Gabriel were liable for the
deficiency in estate tax due as transferees at law. 107 Richard and Gabriel
failed to respond to the affirmative allegation of the IRS." On August
20, 1990, the Tax Court thus deemed the allegation to be admitted
under the court's procedural rules.w°
The IRS then filed a motion for summary judgment, relying upon
the pleadings, the affirmative allegation deemed to be admitted and
the earlier stipulated decision of the Tax Court."° The IRS asserted
that the stipulated decision establishing $62,378.48 as the amount of
estate tax was res judicata with respect to the amount of the estate tax
liability." 1
 Further, the IRS asserted that Richard and Gabriel, as trans-
ferees at law under section 6324(a) (2) of the Code, were each liable
for $50,000 plus interest on the unpaid estate tax." 2 At this time,
Richard and Gabriel retained counsel."'
Ic* Baptiste v. Commissioner, No. 44928-85, 1988 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 156, at *1 (May 13, 1988).
101 See Brief for Appellant at 3, Baptiste 11 (No. 93-2960).
102
 See Baptiste I, 100 T.C. 252, 253 (1993). Although Barbara was also technically subject to
transferee liability as a recipient of assets included in her father's taxable estate, the IRS did not
pursue any such claim against her because her financial condition largely precluded any realistic
chance of recovery. See Telephone Interview with Pauli Peter, Attorney {Jan. 17, 1996).
"See Baptiste 1, 100 T.c. at 253.
104 See id.
105 See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1536; Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 434.
1 °6 See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1537; Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 434.
"See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1536; Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 434-35.
108 See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1536; Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 435.
"See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1536; Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 435.
II° See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1536; Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 435.
III See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1537; Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 435.
112 See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1537; Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 435.
315 See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1537; Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 435. Gabriel and Richard both
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In April 1992, the Tax Court granted partial summary judgment
to the IRS."' The Tax Court determined that its earlier stipulated
decision was res judicata as to the existence and amount of the estate
tax due."' The Tax Court then determined that Richard and Gabriel
were each personally liable under section 6324(a) (2) of the Code for
the unpaid taxes to the extent of the $50,000 value of each individual's
interest in the insurance benefits at the time of the decedent's death.''"
The Tax Court reserved judgment as to the extent of Richard's and
Gabriel's liability for accrued interest in excess of the amount each had
received from the life insurance proceeds."'
On March 29, 1993, in Baptiste v. Commissioner ("Baptiste I"), the
Tax Court entered an order finding that Richard and Gabriel were
each personally liable not only for the underlying $50,000 obligation,
but also for the accrued interest on that obligation from the due date
of their father's estate tax return."" The Tax Court reasoned that the
limitation imposed by section 6324(a) (2) applied to a transferee's
liability for unpaid estate tax and for interest accrued thereon that the
transferor owed." 9
 The court concluded that the limitation did not
apply to a transferee's liability for interest accrued on unpaid es-
tate taxes that the transferee owed.' 2" The court noted that section
6324(a) (2) imposes a direct, personal and primary obligation on a
transferee.' 21
 The court concluded that this is an independent liability
and that the interest on this liability was thus not subject to the section
6324(a) (2) limitation.' 22
The Tax Court distinguished its holding from the holding in
Poinier II, which limited the extent of transferee liability in a gift tax
context to the value of the property that the donee received.'" The
Tax Court stated that the basis for the decision in Poinier II was that
the Third Circuit found "no explicit statutory authority" for estab-
lishing an independent liability. 124
 The Tax Court disagreed, conclud-
retained Paul J. Peter of the firm Bruckner, O'Gara, Keating, Hendry, Davis & Nedved, P.C.
(currently Keating, O'Gara, Davis & Nedved, P.C.) in Lincoln, Nebraska. See Telephone Interview
with Pauli. Peter, supra note 102.
I" See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1537; Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 435.
115 See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1537; Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 435.
116 Baptiste 1, 100 T.C. at 253.
117
 Id, at 253-54.
II" Id, at 257. Twelve judges of the twenty judge panel joined the opinion. See id,
119 1d.
120 Id. at 255.
121 Baptiste I, 100 T.C. at 255.
122 See id. at 256-57.
121 Id. at 256.
'24 1d.
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ing that the combination of section 6601 and section 6324(a) (2) did,
in fact, create explicit statutory authority for establishing the inde-
pendent liability.' 25
 The Tax Court noted that the rationale for its
position both in Poinier I and in the present case was that the transferee
had denied the government the use of money owed to the govern-
ment.' 28
 Consequently, section 6601(a) imposed a liability for interest
upon the transferee.' 27
 The effect of the Tax Court's order was to raise
the total obligation for Richard and Gabriel above the value of the
property that each had originally received.' 28 In summary, the Tax
Court held that Richard and Gabriel were liable as transferees for the
full amount of the unpaid liability, including accrued interest from the
due date of their father's estate tax return.' 29
Judge Ruwe concurred in the overall opinion of the Tax Court.' 8°
His concurrence stated that the Tax Court based its holding with
respect to the existence of an independent liability on a literal appli-
cation of section 6601 and that the holding was identical to the tradi-
tional approach to transferee liability under state law.' 3 ' The judge
stated that limiting the liability of the Baptistes here to $50,000—the
value of the property received—would radically change the traditional
concept of transferee liability.' 32 The judge concluded that there was
nothing to indicate that Congress intended section 6324(a) (2) to cre-
ate any such radical change.'"
Judge Ruwe further stated that a contrary holding would reward
those who delay in paying their obligations.' 84 The judge noted that if
there was a cap on Richard's and Gabriel's total liability, the longer
they delayed in paying that liability, the more money they could make
from their use and enjoyment of the original $50,000. 1 " In summary,
Judge Ruwe concluded that Richard and Gabriel were liable for the
full amount of the unpaid liability because a contrary holding would
represent an unwarranted radical departure from the traditional ap-
125 Id.
' 26
 Baptiste I, 100 T.C. at 257.
157 See id.
128 See id.
Ina
114' Id. at 258 (Ruwe, J., concurring). Six judges of the twenty judge panel joined in this
concurring opinion. See id. at 260. Each of the judges that joined this concurrence also joined
the opinion of the court. See id. at 257.
131
 Baptiste I, 100 T.C. at 258 (Ruwe, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 259 (Ruwe, J., concurring).
133 Id. (Ruwe, J., concurring).
134 Id. (Ruwe, J., concurring).
135 See id. (Ruwe, J., concurring).
May 19971
	
TRANSFEREE LIABILITY	 489
proach to transferee liability and would reward those who delay in
paying their obligations.' 36
Judge Halpern also concurred in the overall opinion of the Tax
Court, but disagreed with the rationale behind the opinion.'" Judge
Halpern first noted that nothing in section 6324(a) (2) explicitly pro-
vides that the transferee liability is a tax liability.'" The judge then
reasoned that, on the contrary, if the transferee liability were a tax
liability, section 6901—which provides that transferee liability should
be treated in the same manner as the underlying tax liability—would be
redundant.'"' The judge concluded accordingly that the liability cre-
ated under section 6324(a) (2) is, in fact, not a tax liability, but some
other form of personal liability.'" Judge Halpern further concluded
that because section 6901 subjects transferee liability to the same pro-
visions as the underlying tax liability, the IRS may use section 6601 to
assess interest On liabilities arising under section 6901.' 41
 The judge
finally stated that section 6324(a) (2) plays no role in the determination
of interest on the liability, other than providing the predicate for an
individual's status as a transferee under section 6901. 142 In summary,
Judge Halpern concluded that Richard and Gabriel were liable for the
full amount of the unpaid liability because the interest portion of their
liability was not a tax liability and was thus not subject to the limits on
transferee liability contained in section 6324(a) (2). 1 "
Judge Colvin dissented from the Tax Court's opinion.'" His dis-
sent focused on a plain language interpretation of section 6324(a) (2)
and concluded that the liability of a transferee should be capped at
the value of the property received.'" The judge cited Poinier II approv-
ingly and stated that it was not patently unreasonable for Congress to
limit the total liability of transferees to the value of the property
received because the instances in which such a question would be likely
to arise would be comparatively rare.' 46
 In summary, Judge Colvin
136 Baptiste. I, 100 T.C. at 260 (Rowe, J., concurring).
131 /d. (Halpern, J., concurring). One other judge of the twenty judge panel joined in this
concurrence. See id. at 267. Neither of these judges joined in the opinion of the court. See id.
at 257.
193 Id. at 262 (Halpern, J., concurring).
139 Id. at 263 n.3 (Halpern, J., concurring).
140 Id. at 262 (Halpern, J., concurring).
141 Baptiste I, 100 T.C. at 264 (Halpern, J., concurring).
142 Id. at 267 (Halpern, J., concurring).
143 Id. (Halpern, J., concurring).
144 Id. (Colvin, J. , dissenting), Five other judges of the twenty judge panel joined in this
dissent. See id. at 271 (Colvin, J., dissenting).
145 1d. at 268-119 (Colvin, J., dissenting).
146 Baptiste 1, 100 T.C. at 270 (Colvin, J., dissenting).
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concluded that Richard's liability and Gabriel's liability should not
exceed $50,000, because that was the value of the property that each
received.' 47
As a resident of Nebraska, Gabriel appealed to the Eighth Cir-
cuit.'" His appeal challenged the Tax Court's determination that his
status as a transferee was res judicata.'" In addition, he contended that
even if he was liable as a transferee for unpaid estate taxes, the amount
of his liability was limited to the actual value of the interest transferred,
namely $50,000.'" As a resident of Florida, Richard appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit.' 51 Richard's appeal similarly challenged the Tax Court's
determination that his status as a transferee was res judicata. 152 Richard
also contended that even if he was liable as a transferee, the amount
of his liability was limited to $50,000.'"
On July 12, 1994, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
holding with respect to the issue of res judicata. 154 The Eighth Circuit
reversed, however, the Tax Court's holding with respect to the extent
of Gabriel's liability.'" Relying on a plain language interpretation of
section 6324(a) (2) and citing Poinier //approvingly, the Eighth Circuit
limited Gabriel's liability as a transferee to the actual value of the
interest transferred. 156 The court stated that the IRS position of advo-
cating an independent liability was an "artificial construction" of the
Code.' 57 The court further stated that the IRS position "ignores the fact
that section 6324(a) (2) juxtaposes a transferee's personal liability with
the limitation on [that] liability." 158 The court noted additionally that
the IRS position also "ignores the critical interplay between section
6324(a) (2) and section 6601(e) (1)" which accords the same provisions
and limitations to transferee liability as to the original, underlying
liability.'" In summary, the Eighth Circuit held that Gabriel's personal
liability was limited to the $50,000 amount that he had actually re-
147 See id. (Colvin, J., dissenting).
148 See Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 435.
149 See id. at 435-37.
159 See id. at 437.
151 See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1537.
152 See id. at 1535.
153 See id.
154 Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 437.
155 1d. at 438.
1545 1d. at 437-38.
157 1d. at. 438.
155 Id.
159 Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 438.
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ceivecl. 16° The IRS petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.''' The
Supreme Court denied certiorari on February 27, 1995. 16'
On August 29, 1994, however, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
Tax Court decision with respect to Richard in its entirety.' 6' On the
issue of the extent of the transferee liability, the Eleventh Circuit closely
followed the reasoning in Judge Halpern's concurrence to conclude
that Richard's liability under section 6324(a) (2) was "not a tax liability,
but an independent personal obligation."'" The court further con-
cluded that section 6901(a) "authorizes the government to impose
interest on the obligation of the transferee under section 6601 as if it
were a tax liability." 165
 The court noted that its conclusion was "further
bolstered by common sense, as it was unlikely that Congress would alter
the traditional rule that one who possesses funds of the government
must pay interest for the period that person enjoys the benefit of
same."' 66 The Eleventh Circuit finally concluded that the limitations in
section 6324(a) (2) applied only to the original, underlying tax obliga-
tion. 167
 In summary, the Eleventh Circuit held that Richard was liable
for interest on his underlying obligation without limit from the due
date of the estate tax return for his father's estate.' 68 Richard did not
appeal the decision of the Eleventh Circuit, primarily because of per-
sonal financial reasons.' 69 As a result, the circuit courts were left with
exact opposite conclusions from an identical fact pattern.'"
III. UNRESOLVED CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CIRCUITS
By the happenstance of the Baptiste brothers living in two differ-
ent federal circuits, there is now a direct and unresolved conflict
between the circuits with respect to the extent of transferee liability. 171
Two significant issues arise here. First, what are the implications of this
conflict for the practicing attorney? Second, which of the two positions
should prevail if the issue of transferee liability arises in yet another
' 6° Id.
161 See Commissioner v. Baptiste, 115 S. Ct. 1251, 1261 (1995).
162 Id.
163
 Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1535.
361 1d. at 1542.
165 Id.
166 Id.
' 67 Id.
' 68 Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1542.
169 See Telephone Interview with Paull. Peter, supra note 102.
37° Compare Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1535, with Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 438.
171
 Compare Baptiste III, 29 F.3d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1994), with Baptiste II, 29 F.3d 433, 438
(8th Cir. 1994).
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circuit? This section of the Note suggests that the planning implica-
tions are broader than they might initially appear. This discussion
arrives at an initial conclusion that the logic of the Eleventh Circuit
more accurately reflects the apparent intent of Congress than the logic
of the Eighth Circuit.
A. Planning Implications
The lack of case law in the area of transferee liability, though
frustrating to the attorney, is not indicative of the lack of importance
of the overall issue of transferee liability. This lack of case law may
simply be more of a reflection that in the instances in which transferee
liability arises, the amounts involved do not warrant pursuing the issue
all the way through the court system and the parties usually settle
instead. For example, Richard Baptiste did not pursue the full range
of his legal options because of financial limitations.'" In cases involving
smaller sums, the issue may not come to trial at all.
Nonetheless, the attorney should not underestimate the potential
extent of a client's transferee liability. Transferee liability will only arise
in situations in which the transferor has not paid the original tax
liability. As such, by the time that the transferee is even aware of his or
her liability, the tax obligation may already be long overdue. As with
any overdue tax liability, the interest and penalties may far exceed the
amount of the original liability, with or without a cap on that liability.
Another concern is that the transferee may have long since dissipated
the transferred property and, therefore, may only be able to satisfy the
transferee liability from other personal assets—if at all.
The practicing attorney faces two significant problems in this area.
First, transferee liability is not limited to estate taxes. The Code applies
transferee liability to income taxes and gift taxes.'" As such, the issue
is far broader than it might initially appear.
Second, transferee liability is a difficult issue to spot in advance
and consequently is a difficult area in which to prepare an effective
planning strategy. Even if the Baptiste brothers had been represented
by counsel from the beginning of their ordeal, it is not at all apparent
that anyone could have foreseen the actions of their stepmother. Fur-
ther, the law in this area is not well settled. At this point, it appears
that the attorney could reasonably advise a client that transferee liabil-
172 See Telephone Interview with Pauli. Peter, supra note 102.
173 See generally 1.R.C. § 6321 (1988) (discussing income taxes); id § 6324(6) (discussing gift
taxes).
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ity will be limited to the value of the property that the client received
if the client Jives in the Third or the Eighth Circuits. If the client lives
in the Eleventh Circuit, the extent of the transferee liability appears to
be essentially unlimited. For a client who lives in any of the other
circuits, the likely outcome of a transferee liability case is unpredictable.
Precedent in the Tax Court, however, indicates that a client living in
any part of the country may have to be willing to carry the battle all
the way to the circuit court to prevail on the issue of capping the extent
of transferee liability to the value of the property received.
B. The Two Approaches
The principal issue discussed above concerning the extent of
transferee liability is essentially straightforward: is the interest that has
accrued on the unpaid liability simply another form of a tax or is the
interest some other form of liability? If the interest is the former, then
the statutory language of section 6324(a) (2) and section 6601 (e) (1)
controls."' The result is that the "plain language" approach of the
courts in Poinier II and Baptiste II is correct and transferee liability is
capped at the value of the property received. 17' But if the interest is
another form of personal liability that simply looks like a tax, then the
statutory language of section 6901(a) (1) controls and the interest
represents an independent liability. 16
 Under this "independent liabil-
ity" approach, the court in Baptiste III is correct and the extent of the
transferee liability is unlimited.' 77
It is tempting to surrender to the simplicity of the plain language
approach of the courts in Poinier II and Baptiste Him If transferee
liability can be resolved as a matter of plain language, then the inquiry
is over; there is no need to look any further, for example, at the intent
of the drafters. 179 The courts in Poinier II and Baptiste H further bolster
their argument by claiming that there is no explicit statutory provision
supporting the existence of an independent liability.' 80
 Judge Halpern
of the Tax Court, however, effectively shatters the simplicity of the plain
language approach. 18 ' Judge Halpern's construction of different pro-
visions of the Code casts doubt as to just how "plain" the meaning of
174 See Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 437,
175
 See id.; Poinier II, 858 F.2d 917, 920 (3d Cir. 1988).
176 See Baptiste III, 29 F.3d at 1541.
177 See id. at 1541-42.
178 See Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 437; Poinier II, 858 F.2d at 920.
1711 See, e.g., Griffin v, Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982).
180 See Baptiste II, 29 F.3d at 497; Poinier II, 858 F.2d at 920.
151
 See generally Baptiste I, 100 T.C. at 260-67 (Halpern, J., concurring).
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the statutes really is and rebuts the concern over the lack of explicit
statutory provisions supporting the existence of the independent habil-
ity.182 Judge Ruwe further weakens the plain language approach.'" As
both Judge Ruwe and the Eleventh Circuit conclude, the inevitable
result of adopting the plain language approach is illogical.' 84 With
liability capped, the taxpayer has no incentive to actually pay the
transferee liability; the longer the taxpayer holds onto the money, the
more interest the taxpayer will earn at the expense of the govern-
ment.'• Further, if a plain language approach is no longer appropriate
for statutory interpretation, then it becomes important to look to the
intent of the drafters. 188 As Judge Ruwe notes, this would be a radical
break from the traditional concept, and there is nothing in the legis-
lative history indicating that Congress intended such a break. 187 As
such, the logic of the independent liability approach appears on the
surface to be more compelling with respect to the determination of
the proper characterization of the interest liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Another issue arises here concerning the extent of transferee
liability, which the Tax Court and the various circuit courts have ap-
parently ignored entirely. In particular, should transferee liability exist
at all in cases such as this, where the transferee appears to be innocent
of all wrongdoing? The purpose of transferee liability is to prevent
transferors from escaping tax liability by transferring property to an-
other entity.' 88 To the extent that the transferor intended the transfer
as a means of tax avoidance, transferee liability accomplishes its stated
purpose. But there is no evidence from the Baptiste cases that Mr.
Baptiste purchased the life insurance policy for the purpose of avoid-
ing estate taxes. Instead, it seems far more likely that Mr. Baptiste was
motivated primarily by a desire to provide a financial legacy for his
children. If anything, Mr. Baptiste's purchase of the life insurance
policy compounded the issue of his estate's total estate tax liability; the
life insurance proceeds increased the size of his taxable estate and thus
increased the size of his estate tax liability. 189 The application of trans-
182 See id. (Halpern, J., concurring).
183 See generally id. at 258-60 (Ruwe, J., concurring).
1134 See id. at 259.
11111 See id.
1811 See, e.g., Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571.
1H7 See Baptiste I, 100 T.C. at 259,
1814 See Brief for Appellee at 21, Baptiste ll (No. 93-2960).
1 • See I.R.C. § 2042(2) (1988).
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feree liability in the Baptiste cases harmed only the innocent parties
and was thus inappropriate.
There is then a third approach for dealing with transferee liability.
In the absence of the apparent primary intent of the transferor to avoid
taxes, transferee liability should be ignored altogether with respect to
innocent transferees. This approach is not without precedent. Section
6013 of the Code relieves an innocent spouse from liability for a
substantial understatement of income by the other spouse on a joint
income tax return when the innocent spouse establishes that he or she
"did not know of, and had no reason to know or' the actions of the
other spouse which gave rise to the liability. 19" The approach suggested
here would simply extend this idea to another area of transferee
liability and to a broader class of innocent transferees.
An "innocent party" approach to transferee liability would have
more accurately reflected the equities of the Baptiste cases. There is
no evidence that the Baptiste brothers were anything other than inno-
cent transferees. There is similarly no evidence that the brothers knew
or had any reason to know that their stepmother would refuse to
release funds to pay the estate tax liability. Yet under either of the
approaches that the courts considered, the brothers lost their full
inheritance from their father. The only issue before the courts was
whether they would lose even more.
The courts involved in the various Baptiste cases erred by not at
least considering this innocent party approach to the issue of trans-
feree liability. The courts may argue in response that because the issue
was not raised by any of the parties, the matter was not properly before
the courts. Such an argument is largely self-serving. The courts may
have been constrained not to have decided the Baptiste cases on the
basis of an argument not offered by either party. But the courts could
at least have explored the argument on their own, if for no other
reason than to signal their willingness to entertain this approach from
the next innocent transferee. Nor are judicially imposed limitations on
transferee liability without precedent.' 91
§ 0013. Exceptions for innocent transferees are not confined to the IRS Code. For
example, the Bankruptcy Code protects good faith transferees for value from the avoidance
powers of the bankruptcy trustee by preserving the interest transferred to the transferee. See
generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548(c) (1988). Similarly, the Uniform Commercial Code allows good
faith purchasers in the ordinary course of business to take free of any security interests pertaining
to the seller, even if the purchaser knows of the security interest. See generally U.C.C. § 9-907
(1972). Even Judge Halpern recognizes the need for some limits to transferee liability, as absolute
unlimited liability would lead to "a patently unfair and irrational result." See Baptiste I, 100 T.C.
252,'261 (1993).
191 See, e.g., Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311, 318 (9th Cir. 1962).
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For now, the status of the law remains unsettled in most circuits,
even without consideration of an innocent party approach that this
Note advocates. A prudent strategy for the attorney who becomes
aware that his or her client has received a substantial gift is to advise
the client to look at all such gift horses carefully, lest they turn out to
be made in Troy.
STUART J. HAMILTON
